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THE NORTH CAR OLINA LAW REVIEW

declarant is available as a witness.2 4 The suggestion that that dictum went so far as to lay it down that the declaration as to state of'
mind would be admissible to show a future act though the declarant
is available is subject to question.2 5 It is quite likely that Mr.
Justice Gray in writing the opinion in that case did not observe the
distinction but the words of the dictum may fairly be taken to have
reference to admitting declarations to show state of mind just for the
26
purpose of showing state of mind.
If accused offers the note to show his innocence it should be excluded. Though the contrary view has support, 27 it is believed that
the dictum of the Hillmon case does not logically require the admission of declarations as to presently existing state of mind to show'
past conduct. 28 Furthermore, as recently suggested in an acute article
in the Yale Law Journal,2 9 where the accused is available to testify
directly concerning the fact of guilt, it is undetirable and unnecessary
to tread the tortuous maze of the hearsay exception in question. The
recollection of the accused as to the fact of his guilt or innocence
would hardly have dimmed since the note was written. Finally, it
would give the accused an unwarranted advantage to allow him to
introduce the note as positive evidence on the question of guilt because he could still exercise his privilege against self-crimination and.
thereby escape cross examination by the state.

J. B.

FORDHAM.

JURISDICTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTY FOR PURPOSE
OF ATTACHMENT

The extraordinary remedy of foreign attachment is governed by
local statutes in the several states. 1 These statutes are based on the'
fact of the debtor's non-residence and the presence of his property
within the state. Consequently it becomes important for courts to
"'Ibid.
"Art. cit. supra note 21, 285.
' Supra note 23. The dictum is premised with this sentence: "The existence

of a particular intention in a certain person at a certain time being a material
fact to be proved, evidence that he expressed that intention at that time is as:
direct evidence of the fact, as his own testimony that he then had that intention would be."
'Eustace Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule (1912), 26 HAmv. L.
REV. 146.
'John MacArthur Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty-three Years After
(1925), 38 HARv. L. REV. 709.
Art. cit. supra note 21, 287.
1The N. C. Statute, C. S. §§798, 799.

NOTES
decide upon the meaning of the term "non-resident." Likewise,
difficulties occur when jurisdiction of the debtor's property is acquired by trick or stratagem.
In a recent North Carolina case 2 the defendant became ill and
left the state for the purpose of regaining his health. His condition
became worse, making his return impossible until he improved considerably. Suit by attachment was brought about a year after he had
left. The court held him to be a non-resident within the meaning
of the statute. In a West Virginia case s the defendant left the state
for the purpose of taking care of her husband who was seriously ill.
'When she had been gone about ten months this suit was brought.
The court ruled that she was a resident of the state. In both cases
the defendants always intended to return as soon as was practicable.
The purpose and most natural result of attachment is to compel
-the presence of the defendant in court. 4 But there is no intention to
subject residents, who leave the state temporarily, to summary proceedings. 5 When one leaves the state with no intention of returning
it is generally held that he is a non-resident as soon as he crosses the
state line. 6 But the intention alone without a removal or a definite
act in furtherance of that intention is not sufficient. Likewise, ab•sence from the state, but with intention to return, does not constitute
non-residence unless the absence is so protracted as to make personal8
7
service impossible for a great length of time. In Knapp v. Gerson,
it is said that three elements must be considered; the length of the
stay, the purpose thereof and the debtor's intentions as to returning.
Thus although the reason for this type of relief is the impossibility
of service of summons upon the defendant, that alone is not a test
-of the defendant's non-residence. Otherwise the length of the absence
from the state necessary to constitute one a non-resident might easily
'be fixed by statute.
'Brann v. Hanes, 194 N. C. 571, 140 S. E. 292 (1927).

'Kanawha Bank & Trust Co. v. Swisher, 144 S. E. 294 (W. Va., 1928).
'Blair v. Winston, 84 Md. 356, 35 AtI. 1101; Raymond v. Leishman, 243
Pa. 64; 89 Atl. 791, L. R. A. 1915A 400-(1914) ; cf. Keller v. Carr, 40 Minn.
-428, 42 N. W. 292, where the primary object is said to be to furnish a remedy
against the debtor's property when he is beyond the reach of ordinary process.
'Wheeler v. Cobb, 75 N. C. 21 (1876); Risewick v. Davis, 19 Md. 82

.(1862).

'Whitehill v. Eicherly, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 593 (1894) ; Balinger v. Lantier, 15
Kan. 608 (1875) ; Mann v. Taylor, 78 Iowa 355, 43 N. W. 221 (1889) ; Lyle v.
:Foreman, 1 Dall. (U. S.), 480, 1 L. Ed. 232 (1792). In Burt v. Allen, 48 W.
Va. 154, 35 S.E. -990, 50 L. R. A. 284, 86 Am. St. Rep. 29 (1900), held nonxesidence before crossing state line.
Winakur v. Hazard, 140 Md. 102, 116 AtI. 850, 26 A. L. R. 177.
s25 F. 197 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1885).
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By far the greatest difficulty arising in this consideration is the
case of an indefinite absence whose length is dependent upon a contingency.9 And when the impossibility or impracticability of the
debtor's return is superadded, the question can hardly be decided
under a definite rule of law. Here, consideration of the policy of
attachment statutes and the facts peculiar to each situation must
enter in. Whatever the position of the defendant may be, the creditor
is nevertheless without remedy unless attachment lies. Still it would
be highly undesirable to allow attachment against the property in
every case, where the creditor must otherwise suffer, without due
consideration of the absent debtor's position.1o
Although on its face it may seem that the results reached in the
two cases under discussion are in conflict they are nevertheless justified by all the attendant facts. In each the length of the absence was
the same, the intention to return and the indefiniteness of the time of
return existed. However in the North Carolina case it was improbable that the defendant would return at all while in the other it was
rather certain. It is altogether desirable that the language of the
statutes and the state of decided cases are such as to allow great latitude to the courts in passing upon this question.
The other problem here under discussion arises in a recent Virginia case. 11 The plaintiff, a resident of Virgina, knowing that the
defendant's note, to which was attached another note as collateral
security, was owned by S in District of Columbia, had H buy it and
bring it into Virginia where it was attached for a debt owing to the
plaintiff from the defendant. The defendant entered plea in abatement to the jurisdiction on the ground that it had been procured by
fraud. Held, that the court will not exercise its jurisdiction and
that the attachment be vacated.
The general rule governing this question is that the court will not
exercise its jurisdiction over the property of a non-resident when it
'Hickson v. Brown, 92 Ga. 225, 17 S. E. 1035 (1893) ; Weitkamp v. Loehr,
21 Jones & S., 79 (N. Y., 1886); Keelin v. Graves, 129 Tenn. 103, 165 S. W.
232'L. R. A. 1915A 421 (1914); Garlinghouse v. Mulvane, 40 Kan. 428, 19
Pac. 798 (1888) ; Mahoney v. Tyler, 136 N. C. 40, 48 S. E. 549 (1904) ; Tyler v.
Mahoney, 166 N. C. 509, 82 S. E. 870 (1914).
"A continuance may be secured by a defendant served with summons if
the circumstances are such as to warrant it. 92 N. C. 297 (1884). He is
deprived of this right if foreign attachment is brought even though the reason
of his absence would otherwise sustain a request for a continuance. Supra note 2.
'Abel v. Smith, 144 S. E. 616 (Va., 1928).

NOTES
has been obtained by any deceitful contrivance, trick, or stratagem.1 2
It is within the discretion of the court whether to exercise jurisdiction in such a case and since "it is a thing affecting the court itself
and the integrity of its process,"'1 the court will vacate the attachment
if requested to do so by the deceived defendant unless he has waived
his right by pleading to the merits of the case.1 4
But when the defendant's property has been brought into a state
by trick or stratagem involving no fraud the above reasoning does
not apply. There are only a few decided cases where the court permitted the exercise of its jurisdiction procured by a trick without
actual fraud. The outstanding case is Siro v. American Express
Company.1 5 Defendant, a foreign corporation against whom the
plaintiff held a claim, had placed American Express travelers check
in the hands of its local agent. Plaintiff's attorney bought checks to
the amount of the claim and had the proceeds in the hands of the
agent attached. The checks were bought solely for the purpose of
attachment. The court refused to vacate the attachment saying that
no deceit had been practiced. In Condon Wrapping Machine Co.,
Inc. v. Dearborn'6 the plaintiff through correspondence induced defendant, a non-resident, to send certain property to an attorney at
plaintiff's residence through whom a sale was to be consummated, with
the object of attaching the purchase price in the attorney's hands.
Held: the attachment must stand. There were no false representations and no deceit.
Siro v. Amer. Exp. Co., 99 .Conn. 95, 121 Atl. 280, 37 A. L. R. 1250 (1923);
Sessoms Groc. Co. v. Inter. Sugar Feed Co., 188 Ala. 232, 66 So. 479 (1914).
The rule is the same where service of summons on the person is obtained by
fraudulent trick. The inclination here to hold service invalid is even greater

than in the attachment cases, apparently since the person has always been considered more inviolable than property. Union Sugar Refinery v. Mathieson, 2
Cliff. (U. S.), 304, Fed. Cas. 14, 397 (1864) ; Chubuck v. Cleveland, 37 Minn.
466, 35 N. W. 362, 5 Am. St. Rep. 864 (1887); cf. Jaster v. Currie, 198 U. S.
144, 25 S.Ct. 614, 49 L. Ed. 988 (1904) ; Case v. Smith Lineweaver Co., 152 F.
730, 732 (C. C. E. D. N. Y., 1907).

"It would seem that it affects the parties to the suit rather than the court
itself, post note 14. In Colonial Lumber Co. v. Andelusia Nat. Bank, 138
Miss. 566, 103 So. 343 (1925), the court specifically points out that the defendant conceived a plan of ordering goods in order to attach proceeds of draft.
Whether or not the plea to the jurisdiction was waived does not appear but

the court gives no further mention to this point; Acme Hay Co. v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 198 Iowa 1337, 201 N. W. 129 (1924).
"Dailey Motor Co. v. Reaves, 184 N. C. 260, 114 S.E. 175 (1922) ; Scott
v. Mutual Reserve Life Ass'n., 137 N. C.515, 50 S.E. 221 (1905).
Supra note 12.
"168 N. Y. Supp. 718 (1918).

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In a North Carolina case' 7 plaintiff ordered five electric lighting
plants requesting that one be shipped immediately for exhibition
purposes and paying part price of the entire lot. The article proved
worthless and the plaintiff sought a recission of the contract and the
return of the money. Defendant refused and shipped the rest of the
machinery "order notify" though apparently not at plaintiff's request. Upon arrival plaintiff paid draft and attached the proceeds.
Although the plea to the jurisdiction was held to be waived by a
plea to the merits, the court evidently considered the case as one
where attachment should not be allowed.' 8
In Abel v. Smith'9 it seems that the court fails to distinguish the
case of ftaudulently procuring property to be brought into a state,
from the case of procuring property to be brought into a state solely
for the purpose of attachment.20 There is no authority for the statement that the non-resident's property must find its way into a state
casually and in the regular course of business, hor that the attachment cannot stand if the plaintiff has done any acts whatsoever in
enabling the court to secure jurisdiction over the res. The gist of
the rule is actual fraud or deceit. Courts are averse to allowing one
to prosecute a legal advantage obtained by unlawful means. But
where nothing illegal has been done, neither policy nor authority require that the advantage be relinquished. The fraud may be accomplished in many ways, either by acts, or words, or concealment of
material facts, but it must exist. 2 ' If the defendant has placed himself in an unfavorable position and the plaintiff takes an advantage
thus afforded, the defendant should suffer the consequences. When
Smith issued the note in question, there was no assurance given him
that it would remain always in Virginia. In fact he might reason'Economy Elect. Co. v. Auto Elect. Power & Light Co., 185 N. C. 534,
118 S. E. 3 (1923).
'The opinion seems to infer that the fraud was in inducing defendant to
ship "order notify." It is difficult to see how else the goods might have been
shipped. Under straight bill of lading the defendant would have been in a
worse position while C. 0. D. express would have been as bad.
" Supra note 11.
"' In Abel v. Smith, supra note 11, the court attempts to distinguish the case
of Siro v. Amer. Ex. Co., supra note 12, on the ground that no property belonging to the defendant had been brought into the state. Nevertheless it was the
plaintiff's act which made it possible that the defendant should have property
there subject to attachment when there had been none before. To make a
distinction upon such grounds seems to border on equivocation.
' Stewart v. Wyoming Ranch Co., 128 U. S. 383, 9 S. Ct. 101, 32 L. Ed. 439
(1888) ; Jaster v. Currie, supra note 12. But cf. Case v. Smith Line Weaver
Co., supra note 12; Wood v. Wood, 78 Ky. 624 at 629 (1880).
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ably have contemplated, due to the currency of negotiable instruments that it would find its way into another state. If the court holds
that fraud' was practiced by bringing the note into Virginia for the
sole purpose of attaching the collateral, the fraud would be against
the holder rather than Smith.
Burpee, J., in Siro v. American Express Co.,22 advances an argument which apparently has been given little consideration by other
courts. He says, "The defendant has not been oppressed or seriously
harmed by the retention of the money in the hands of its agent. It
has not lost it. . . . If the defendant has a goQd defense to plaintiff's
suit it should rather welcome its determination. . . . Its plea to the
jurisdiction is not adopted to appeal persuasively to the equitable
powers of the court."
There is a reluctance upon the part of the courts to grant relief
in cases which fall in the penumbra of the rule. They are afraid of
giving the appearance of fighting for jurisdiction of causes, a practice
for which the old common law courts are condemned. Foreign attachment is today an important and needful remedy and should be
allowed, in the absence of actual fraud, in the type of case herein
discussed.
HARRY RoCKWELL.
JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL LANDS WITHIN THE STATE

In view of the present ownership by the United States of large
tracts of land in North Carolina (including post-office sites, military
reservations, custom houses, national forests, etc.), and the prospective ownership of the proposed Great Smoky Mountain National
Park,' our courts will probably have to decide a number of controversies involving a balance of state and federal power.
The necessity for absolute independence of the National Government and exclusive sovereignty over the seat of government and
certain other places was impressed upon the framers of the Constitution by the insults of rioting soldiers to the Continental Congress at
Philadelphia in 1778, forcing it to seek the protection of the state of
New Jersey. When the original resolution on the subject was introduced in the convention, it only provided for exclusive jursidiction
over lands to be acquired for the seat of government. The committee
1"Supra

note 12.Laws, 1927, ch.
N. C. Public
48, authorizing acquisition by United States
of 700,000 acres in North Carolina for public park purposes.

